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Introduction 
In June 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, often referred to by its 
Arabic acronym daesh, declared that it had established an Islamic Caliphate 
in the territory under its control.1  This territory included areas surrounding 
Fallujah, Tikrit and Mosul, Iraq’s second most-populated city after Baghdad.  
It also incorporated territory within Syria, especially near the city of Raqqah, 
which had become Daesh’s headquarters.  Soon thereafter, other violent 
extremists issued statements of support for Daesh and, in some instances, 
declared local wilayat (provinces) of the Islamic State.  By September 2015, 
Daesh had recognized provinces in parts of Libya, Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, 
Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Russia, and Afghanistan.2  Suddenly, policymakers in 
the United States and elsewhere faced the dilemma of how to address the 
threat of Daesh’s expansion. 
 
Social media is a key factor in Daesh’s global distribution of affiliates.  
Sophisticated social media propaganda generation and distribution have 
made the Internet an effective tool for generating recruits and coordinating 
efforts.  Between 27,000 and 31,000 people traveled to Iraq and Syria to fight 
for IS and its affiliates.  Social media was a decisive factor catalyzing of the 
flow of recruits in communities across the world and continues to be the 
primary recruitment tool in the Americas.3 
 
This article addresses the national security dilemma posed by Daesh’s social 
media-fueled expansion using Twitter data to measure the spread of Daesh’s 
propaganda over time for local populations within Egypt, a country where 
secular, moderate Islamic and extremist ideologies are actively competing for 
the hearts and minds of its population.  We call this resonance analysis in the 
                                                     
1 Al Jazeera and agencies, “Sunni Rebels Declare a New Islamic Caliphate,” June 30, 
2014, available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/isil-declares-
new-islamic-caliphate-201462917326669749.html.  
2 Lara Jakes, “Who’s Part of the Islamic State?  Depends on Who You Ask,” Foreign 
Policy, (2015), available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/21/whos-part-of-the-
islamic-state-depends-whom-you-ask/; Charlie Winter, “The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: 
Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy,” Quilliam Foundation (2015), 
available at:  http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-
propaganda-strategy.pdf; Aaron Zelin, “New Video Message from the Islamic State: 
‘Victory from God and An Imminent Conquest–Wilayat al-Khayr,’ Jihadology (2015), 
available at: http://jihadology.net/2015/05/11/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-
state-victory-from-god-and-an-imminent-conquest-wilayat-al-khayr/. 
3 The Soufan Group. “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign 
Fighters into Syria and Iraq,” (2015), available at: http://soufangroup.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf. 
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technical sense of a re-sounding, and it serves as a measure of effectiveness by 
quantifying the geographic degree and intensity of propaganda spread and 
uptake by the populace.  Resonance analysis works by identifying the distinct 
language in a group's propaganda, and quantifying the uptake of that 
language in general population social media use.  It answers the question, are 
the people talking more or less like an extremist group?  
 
Resonance analysis is an innovative application of existing corpus linguistics 
methods to a national security problem, to create an inexpensive, scalable 
population analysis tool.  The analysis suggests three outcomes.  First, 
Daesh's propaganda is measurable and distinct from other Salafi groups, such 
as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.  Second, while Daesh’s propaganda 
generally does not resonate with Egyptians, its uptake increased in Upper 
Egypt and the Sinai regions during 2014.  Finally, linguistic fingerprints can 
be used to measure the spread of violent extremists' propaganda to local 
populations over time, using off-the-shelf technology and cheap/accessible 
social media data. 
 
Egyptians as a Sample Population to Test the Method 
To conduct this analysis, we collected 6,210,354 tweets from four sub-regions 
within Egypt between January and December 2014.  The four sub-regions 
were the Sinai Peninsula, Alexandria and the coastal provinces, the greater 
Cairo and Nile Delta region, and Upper Egypt.  We chose Egypt in 2014 for 
three reasons.  First, Daesh made significant gains in this country during this 
period; hence, it is an opportunity to observe the social media environment 
surrounding Daesh success.  First, the Egyptian terror group Ansar Beit al-
Maqdis pledged allegiance to Daesh in November 2014 and was accepted into 
the Caliphate by Daesh leaders.4  Within a year, fighters from Ansar Beit al-
Maqdis, now known as the Islamic State in Sinai, placed an improvised 
explosive device on a Russian aircraft departing the Sinai.5  Second, the 
Egyptian population is one of the most connected to social media in the 
region, and thereby, one of the most vulnerable to an extremist group 
                                                     
4 David Kirkpatrick, “Militant Group in Egypt Vows Loyalty to ISIS,” The New York 
Times, November 10, 2014, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/11/world/middleeast/egyptian-militant-group-
pledges-loyalty-to-isis.html?_r=1. 
5 Andrew Roth, “Russia Confirms Sinai Plane Cash was the Work of Terrorists,” The 
Washington Post, November 17, 2015, available at: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russia-confirms-sinai-crash-was-the-work-
of-terrorists/2015/11/17/496286f4-8d05-11e5-ae1f-af46b7df8483_story.html. 
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infamous for its social media prowess.6  Third, Egyptian political space is 
highly contested terrain, with secular, moderate Islamic and extremist 
ideologies all completing for the hearts and minds of the population.  
 
This article proceeds in five sections.  The first section summarizes the use of 
social media, particularly the Twitter data, to study hard to reach populations 
and, more specifically, violent extremists.  The second section provides a brief 
discussion of Daesh and its use of social media in support of its campaign in 
Iraq, Syria, and beyond.  We discuss the data and methods we used to 
measure Daesh’s appeal to Egyptians in the third section.  In the fourth 
section, we present the results from our analysis.  The fifth section concludes 
with a discussion of the implications for United States policy and future 
research on the resonance of violent extremists’ messaging. 
 
Using Social Media to Analyze Hard-to-Reach Populations 
Social media, and specifically Twitter data, has been gaining acceptance 
within the academic community as a new avenue for examining local 
populations, especially hard-to-reach populations.  Computers and mobile 
devices enable people anywhere in the world to interact with each other.  In a 
previous era, states funded and operated global broadcast networks such as 
the Voice of America to engage in messaging; today, extremist non-state 
actors such as Daesh operate sophisticated propaganda, recruiting, and 
funding operations on social media for marginal costs. 
 
There is thus an important need for effective social media analytic methods 
that address national security problems.  In addition, while social media users 
are not a representative sample of the population at large, using Twitter data 
has proved to be useful for analysis in four areas: User networks, user 
sentiments, user demographics, and the flow of information.  This section 
provides a brief overview of how researchers can use Twitter data to address 
these four analytical areas and its application to studies on terrorism and 
political violence.  
 
In terms of social networks, users engage with each other through mentions 
and re-tweets, forming virtual global networks.  Past research found that, 
much like off-line social connections, Twitter users tend to mention and 
                                                     
6 Racha Mourtada and Fadi Salem, “Citizen Engagement and Public Services in the Arab 
World: The Potential of Social Media,” Arab Social Media Report Series (2014): 1-54 
Available at: 10.2139/ssrn.2578993.  
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follow others who hold similar views.7  Thus, Twitter data can be used to build 
and analyze networks of persons with similar views, such as those who might 
support certain political candidates.8  Along these lines, in recent years, 
researchers have begun to use social media data to describe the structure of a 
violent extremist group and its online presence.9  In 2015, Jytte Klausen 
applied a snowball sampling method to study networks of jihadists in Syria 
and Iraq on Twitter.10  
 
Twitter data also have proven to be useful in analyses of users’ sentiment 
towards a pre-designated subject.  One of the earliest applications of this 
method involved market studies of how positive (or negative) Twitter users 
felt about specific brands and products.11  Other research on users’ sentiment 
has attempted to gauge how well a population’s mood corresponds to daily 
variation in stock market indices or even regional variation in support for 
certain political issues.12  This type of research has proven to be particularly 
                                                     
7 Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James M. Cook, “Birds of a Feather: 
Homophily in Social Networks,” Annual Review of Sociology 27:1 (2001): 415, available 
at: 10.1146/annurev.soc.27.1.415; Warren Pearce, Kim Holmberg, Iina Hellsten, and 
Brigitte Nerlich, “Climate Change on Twitter: Topics, Communities and Conversations 
about the 2013 IPCC Working Group 1 Report,” PLoS One 9:4 (2014), available at: 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0094785; Elanor 
Colleoni, Alessandro Rozza, and Adam Arvidsson, “Echo Chamber or Public Sphere?  
Predicting Political Orientation and Measuring Political Homophily in Twitter Using Big 
Data,” Journal of Communication 64:2 (2014), 317, available at: doi: 10.1111/jcom.12084. 
8 Mitchell S. McKinney, J. Brian Houston, and Joshua Hawthorne, “Social Watching a 
2012 Republican Presidential Primary Debate,” American Behavioral Scientist 
58:4(2013): 556, available at: 
http://abs.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/10/17/0002764213506211 
ordoi:10.1177/0002764213506211. 
9 Sarita Azad and Arvind Gupta, “A Quantitative Assessment on 26/11 Mumbai Attack 
using Social Network Analysis,” Journal of Terrorism Research 2:2 (2011): 4, available 
at: http://jtr.st-andrews.ac.uk/articles/10.15664/jtr.187/.  
10 Jytte Klausen, “Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign 
Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38:1 (2015): 1, available at: 
doi:10.1080/1057610X.2014.974948. 
11 Bernard J. Jansen, Mimi Zhang, Kate Sobel, and Abdur  Chowdury, “Twitter Power: 
Tweets as Electronic Word of Mouth,” Journal of the American Society for Information 
Science and Technology 60:11 (2009): 2169, available at: doi:10.1002/asi.21149; Marco 
Pennacchiotti and Ana-Maria Popescu, “A Machine Learning Approach to Twitter User 
Classification,” (paper presented at the Fifth International AAAI Conference on Weblogs 
and Social Media, Sunnyvale, CA, 2011), available at: 
http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSM/ICWSM11/paper/view/2886.  
12 Johan Bollen, Huina Mao, and Xiaojun Zeng, “Twitter Mood Predicts the Stock 
Market,” Journal of Computational Science 2:1 (2011): 1-8.; James W. Pennebaker, 
Matthias R. Mehl, and Kate G. Niederhoffer, “Psychological Aspects of Natural Language 
Use: Our Words, Ourselves,” Annual Review of Psychology 54 (2003): 547-577, available 
at: doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.54.101601.145041; Garrett Glasgow, Matt Golder, and 
Sona N. Golder, “Who ‘Wins’”? Determining the Party of the Prime Minister,” American 
Journal of Political Science 55:4 (2011): 937.doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00524.x.  
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valuable as it can track user sentiment over time and within pre-defined 
geographic spaces, while other researchers use social media to improve 
understanding of user sentiments towards certain violent extremists.13   
 
Finally, using the text of Tweets, researchers also have derived insight from 
both the demographics of Twitter users.  Researchers have explored how 
gender, ethnicity, political orientation, and age may correspond to specific 
features of Tweets, such as topic, number of tweets, vocabulary choices, and 
syntax.14  Findings from this research parallel the conclusions from similar 
“off-line research,” which has found that correspondence exists between 
language use and personal characteristics.15  Extending this research into the 
security realm, some researchers have attempted to identify emerging 
terrorist actors, based on social media data and machine learning 
techniques.16 
 
In terms of the flow of information, researchers have tracked the flow of 
specific ideas through Twitter data, and identified quantitative features of 
Twitter networks that may make some ideas more likely to spread than 
others.17  Researchers also have charted the relative influence of different 
information sources on public knowledge.18  
 
                                                     
13 Gabriel Weimann, “Terror on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube,” Brown Journal of 
World Affairs 16:2 (Spring/Summer 2010): 45, available at:  
https://www.brown.edu/initiatives/journal-world-affairs/162/terror-facebook-
twitter-and-youtube.  
14 Patricia Cavazos-Rehg, Melissa Krauss, Richard Grucza, and Laura Bierut. 
“Characterizing The Followers And Tweets Of A Marijuana-Focused Twitter Handle,” 
Journal of Medical Internet Research 16:6 (2014): 157, available at: 
doi:10.2196/jmir.3247; and Sen Pei, Lev Muchnik, José S. Andrade, Zhiming Zheng, and 
Hernán A. Makse, “Searching For Superspreaders of Information in Real-World Social 
Media,” Scientific Reports 4 (2014), available at: doi:10.1038/srep05547.  
15 J.W Pennebaker, M.R. Mehl, and K.G. Niederhoffer, “Psychological Aspects of Natural 
Language Use: Our Words, Ourselves” Annual Review of Psychology 54:1 (2003):547, 
available at doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.54.101601.145041; E. Hoff, “Interpreting the 
Early Language Trajectories of Children from Low-Ses and Language Minority Homes: 
Implications for Closing Achievement Gaps,” Developmental Psychology 49:1 ( 2013): 4, 
available at: doi:10.1037/a0027238. 
16 Katie Cohen, Fredrik Johansson, Lisa Kaati, and Jonas C. Mork, “Detecting Linguistic 
Markers for Radical Violence in Social Media,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26:1 
(2013): 246, available at: doi:10.1080/09546553.2014.849948.  
17 Pei et al., “Searching for Superspreaders.”  
18 Cinthya Chew and Gunther Eysenbach, “Pandemics in the Age of Twitter: Content 
Analysis of Tweets during the 2009 H1N1 Outbreak,” PloS One 5:1 ( 2010), available at: 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014118; Alessio Signorini, Alberto Maria Segre, and Phillip M. 
Polgreen, “The Use of Twitter to Track Levels of Disease Activity and Public Concern in 
the U.S. During the Influenza H1N1 Pandemic,” PLoS One 6:5 (2011): e19467, available 
at: doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0019467. 
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In summary, social media analysis holds potential for the study of terrorism 
and political violence.  Still social media analyses in this area remain rare.  
Most of the existing research focuses on user networks and sentiment 
analysis.  For this study, we attempt to go one-step further and measure the 
extent to which Daesh’s worldview, not specific ideas, resonates among local 
populations outside Iraq and Syria.  In doing so, the intent is twofold: first, 
assist US policymakers as they attempt to halt Daesh’s recruitment and 
expansion; and, second, demonstrate new uses for social media data in 
studies of political violence. 
 
Daesh’s Use of Social Media 
Daesh relies on a multi-layered set of media centers to produce the content of 
its official propaganda.  For example, al-Furqan Media, al-Hayat Media, 
Ajnad Media, and al-I’tisam Media all produce what could be considered as 
top-level messaging.  This includes sermons issued by Daesh leader, Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi, audio addresses from spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, 
and issues of the English-language magazine Dabiq.19  In addition to these 
top-level messages, Daesh has provincial media offices that produce local 
situation reports, such as the “Victory From God and An Imminent Conquest” 
video series from al-Khayr Province Media Office, or “To the Defiant Tribes of 
the Sinai,” a statement from the Sinai Province Media Office.20  Aaron Zelin’s 
analysis of the 123 media releases from Daesh in a single week in April 2015 
found that top-level outlets represented twenty-two percent of the media 
releases, while the other seventy-eight percent came from province-level 
media centers.21  
 
Daesh targets its messages to a variety of audiences: active opponents, 
international publics, active members, potential recruits, disseminators, 
proselytizers, and enlisters.22  While Arabic language dominates, news outlets 
often translate or publish media releases in other languages.23  Daesh’s 
propaganda content is also sophisticated, varying along with its target 
                                                     
19 Zelin, “New Video Message.” 
20 Ibid; Aaron Zelin, “Picture or it Didn’t Happen: A Snapshot of the Islamic State’s 
Official Media Output,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9:4 (2015): 85, available at: 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/picture-or-it-didnt-happen-
a-snapshot-of-the-islamic-states-official-media.  
21 Zelin, “New Video Message.” 
22 Winter, “The Virtual Caliphate.” 
23 Berger and Morgan, “The ISIS Twitter Census.” 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 10, No. 1
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol10/iss1/4
DOI: http://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.10.1.1527
38 
audiences, covering a wide variety of themes, e.g. from brutality to mercy, 24 
or governance to his (enforcement of adherence to Islamic principles). 25  
 
In summary, Daesh and supporters run a sophisticated social media 
campaign, but questions remain on the impact of this campaign.  Preliminary 
research on this topic, albeit limited, suggests that Daesh’s swarmcast 
dissemination approach, and its content, are partly responsible for attracting 
foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq, now numbering 30,000.26  Daesh’s social 
media also appears to have some impact on the decisions by other jihadists to 
declare themselves as provinces of the Islamic State.  Equally important, some 
evidence suggests that Daesh’s approach has contributed to attacks by lone 
wolves in the United State and elsewhere, including the attack by Tashfeen 
Malik and Syed Rizwan Farook in San Bernardino, California in late 2015.27  
However, researchers know little about where and to what degree Daesh’s 
messages resonate. 
 
Theory & Rationale 
We took a grounded approach to linguistic and rhetorical theory that treats 
language and worldview as inextricably linked: real world language use 
informs our social and political world, and our social and political realities 
influence our language.28  In addition to communicating information, words 
also reflect/shape how we understand the world.  Speakers have choices in 
the words they use and choose language to represent not only the world, as 
they understand it, but also in how they wish to construct it.29 
                                                     
24 Winter, “The Virtual Caliphate…” 2015. 
25 Zelin, “Picture or it Didn’t Happen.” 
26 Doina Chiacu, “FBI Chief Warns of Islamic State Recruits, Lone wolf attacks,” FBI 
Chief Warns of Islamic State Recruits, March 12, 2015, available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fbi-idUSKBN0M81TI20150312; Patricia 
Zengerle, “U.S. fails to stop flow of foreign fighters to Islamic State: Study,” Reuters, 
September 29, 2015, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-
congress-fighters-idUSKCN0RT1VZ20150929.  
27 Declan Walsh, “Tashfeen Malik Was a ‘Saudi Girl’ Who Stood Out at a Pakistani 
University,” The New York Times, December 6, 2015, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/07/world/asia/in-conservative-pakistani-city-a-
saudi-girl-who-stood-out.html?_r=0; Rukmini Callimachi, “Islamic State Says ‘Soldiers 
of Caliphate’ Attacked in San Bernardino,” The New York Times, December 5, 2015, 
available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/06/world/middleeast/islamic-state-
san-bernardino-massacre.html. 
28 Barbara Johnstone, Discourse Analysis (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008), p. 36. 
29 David Kaufer and Amal Al-Malki, “A First for Women in The Kingdom: Arab/West 
Representations of Female Trendsetters in Saudi Arabia,” Journal of Arab & Muslim 
Media Research 2:1-2 (2009): 113, available at: doi:10.1386/jammr.2.1and2.113/1; 
Jeffrey Collins, “Variations in Written English,” (PhD diss.,Carnegie Mellon University, 
2003), available at: http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD= ADA416543; William M. 
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This link between linguistic behavior and worldview has important 
implications for our study.  Controlling the terms of discussion—shaping 
discourse—is critical in persuasion and influence.30  This has particular stakes 
in conflict, where constructing the discourse around the conflict confers 
political advantage.  For example, if one side in a conflict can successfully 
frame the other as terrorists committing atrocities and massacres, the accuser 
now has a powerful social and political advantage for action.31  Shaping 
discourse has multiple dimensions, and in addition to specific word choice 
such as terrorist versus freedom fighter, volume and repetition can powerfully 
structure discourse.32 
 
Because of this link between language and worldview, and its role in public 
conflict, we can treat Daesh as an abstraction of advocacy: a public.  Publics 
are "that portion of the populace engaged in evolving shared opinion on a 
particular issue, with the intent of influencing its resolution.  They are not 
fixed and they are not idealized constructs, they are emergences (italics and 
formatting original)."33  Publics are fluid and emerge from social practice, and 
so change over time dynamically.  In this sense, publics, which are detectable 
by their linguistic structure, are like language itself: temporal, emergent, and 
contested.34  Publics are important from an intelligence and information 
operations perspective because they offer a useful unit of analysis, and thus a 
way to make a weak signal detectable, in the form of the distinctive language 
that is characteristic of publics and help them achieve advocacy goals.35  
 
Using methods borrowed from corpus linguistics, we can treat Daesh' public 
talk as a linguistic corpus, and identify what is characteristic about it.  With a 
                                                     
Marcellino, “Talk Like a Marine: USMC Linguistic Acculturation and Civil–Military 
Argument,” Discourse Studies 16:3 (2014): 385, available at: 
doi:10.1177/1461445613508895. 
30 Van Dijk, Teun A., Discourse and Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
31 DeepaReddy, “Capturing Hindutva: Rhetorics and Strategies,” Religion Compass 5:8 
(2011): 427, p. 432, available at: doi:10.1111/j.1749-8171.2011.00289.x. 
32 Katherine Clegg Smith and Melanie Wakefield, “Textual Analysis of Tobacco 
Editorials: How are Key Media Gatekeepers Framing the Issues?” American Journal of 
Health Promotion 19:5 (2005): 361, available at: doi:10.4278/0890-1171-19.5.361. 
33 Hauser, Gerald A, Introduction to Rhetorical Theory (2nd ed.) (Longrove, IL: 
Waveland Press, 2002), 85. Formatting in the original. 
34 Paul Hopper, “Emergent grammar” (Paper presented at Berkeley Linguistics Society: 
Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting February 14-16, 1987), available at: 
doi:10.4324/9780203809068.ch21. 
35 Hauser, Gerald A. Vernacular Voices: The Rhetoric of Publics and Public Spheres 
(Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), 1-341.; David S. Kaufer and 
Brian B. Butler Rhetoric and the Arts of Design (New York: Routledge, 2010), 1-341, 
available at:  http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/docDetail.action?docID=10814064.  
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large enough sample of word, it is possible to use statistical tests to identify 
the set of distinct words that distinguish one public from another.  We can 
think of this as linguistic model for such groups: which words are statistically 
more likely to be used, and how much more likely–even when those word 
choices seem innocuous.  We can then search for this linguistic model in 
social media traffic from the general population, to quantify and locate where 
the public's talk is resonant.  This concept is distinct from an attempt to track 
or evaluate a meme or particular message; it is arguably a deeper, more 
holistic approach to evaluating to what extent a population has adopted a 
particular group's discourse, and thus representation of the world.  In 
summary, we are measuring a national populace's uptake and reuse of 
propaganda over time, at a regional level of granularity. 
 
Data 
The results in this article draw on two categories of data sources: reference 
corpora and general population social media datasets.  The first data category 
includes sets of public text from which to extract a linguistic model.  For this 
study, we created five different corpora: A primary one of Daesh propaganda, 
a comparison of Muslim Brotherhood language, and three event-based 
corpora to test our model.   
 
The first of these corpora consists of selected examples of language used by 
Daesh in their official propaganda.36  The collection includes twenty-four 
documents released between January 2014 and March 2015, totaling 21,787 
words.  These publications incorporate speech transcripts from Daesh 
leaders, announcements of martyrdoms, daily news round-ups, and other 
official statements released through Daesh media outlets.  The majority of the 
texts originated from JustPasteIt, a site popular among Daesh members and 
supporters.37  
 
                                                     
36 Sheryl Prentice, Paul J. Taylor, Paul Rayson and Elllen  Giebels, “Differentiating Act 
from Ideology: Evidence from Messages For and Against Violent Extremism,” 
Negotiation and Conflict Management Research 5:3 (2012): 289, available at: 
doi:10.1111/j.1750-4716.2012.00103.x; Sheryl Prentice, Paul Rayson and Paul J. Taylor, 
“The Language of Islamic Extremism: Towards an Automated Identification of Beliefs, 
Motivations and Justifications,” International Journal of Corpus Linguistics 17:2 (2012): 
259, available at: doi: 10.1075/ijcl.17.2.05pre. 
37 Carmen Fishwick, “How a Polish Student's Website Became an Isis Propaganda Tool” 
The Guardian, August 15, 2014, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/15/-sp-polish-man-website-isis-
propaganda-tool. 
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Our second corpus consisted of language from the Muslim Brotherhood and 
enabled us to compare our findings against another extremist group’s 
language.38  This corpus contains 31,576 words, and is composed of 
statements from the official Muslim Brotherhood website (2012-2014), videos 
on the Muslim Brotherhood YouTube channel (2102-2014), and status 
updates on the official Muslim Brotherhood Facebook page (2014). 
 
Finally, we created three event-based reference corpora to test the ability of 
our method to detect the spread of talk on real world events we knew had 
happened.  These include text relating to a car bombing in the Sinai on 24 
October 2014, the bombing of a bus full of Korean tourists on 16 February 
2014, and a severe influenza outbreak in Egypt in the same year.   
 
Our second major category of data, a target corpus of general population 
social media, consisted of a sample of data from the social media platform 
Twitter for several sub-regions in Egypt.  Purchased from DataSift consisted 
of a thirty percent sample39  of all tweets sent by Egyptian users in 2014.  This 
dataset consisted of 6,210,354 tweets distributed among four regions: the 
Sinai Peninsula, Cairo/Nile Delta, Alexandria/Coast, and Upper Egypt.  The 
range among regions was large (3 million Tweets in Cairo to 130,000 in the 
Sinai), but all regions contained enough data for valid corpus linguistics 
analysis. 
 
Gathering tweets from the users of a specific country is a non-trivial task, and 
various researchers and organizations have used many methods.  The 
standard way to filter tweets by location is by geo-tag, which matches Tweets 
containing geographic coordinates with a specific geographic area.  While this 
method is highly accurate, few Twitter users report geo-coordinates when 
they tweet40 and relying solely on geo-tagged Tweets can expose the 
researcher to considerable selection bias.  Therefore, we expanded our data 
collection to include Tweets by non-geo-tagged users and instead leveraged 
other geographically specific meta-data to identify each user’s location.  This 
method is commonly referred to as geo-inferencing. 
 
                                                     
38 As part of our preliminary research, we also compared the Daesh reference corpus to 
others developed for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda senior leaders, and al-
Nusrah Front.  We were able to successfully distinguish Daesh talk from al-Qaeda.  
However, for this article, we focused on the Muslim Brotherhood as the main competitor 
and counterpoint for Daesh rhetoric in Egypt. 
39 We gathered tweets from four random weeks per quarter in 2014 for a total of 16 
weeks of data.  
40 Estimates range from 0.5 percent to 2 percent of users. 
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To hone our geo-inferencing technique, we performed several dozen tests on 
different factors to evaluate the discriminatory power of each in filtering users 
by national-level location.41  Ultimately, we elected to use both city and 
province names in the user location field as our geoinferencing filter, 
resulting in an estimated confidence of at least eighty percent.42   
 
Methods: Corpus Linguistics and Statistical Analysis  
Similar to the data sources, analysis methods for this article fall into two 
categories: Extracting a linguistic model for Daesh measuring resonance of 
Daesh’s language among Egyptians, and aggregating Twitter data.  More 
specifically,  
 
1. We built a linguistic model for Daesh’s talk by extracting statistically over-
present words and word pairs.  This lexical approach pulls out distinctive 
features from the building blocks of speech, as opposed to a thematic 
approach at the level of whole messages.   
 
2. We then quantified the match between the Daesh model and Twitter 
accounts across Egypt questioning if  a given Twitter account had a greater 
than random chance match with Daesh’s distinctive language, and how 
many times the language was a greater than random chance match?  
These matches were aggregated by region, over the course of a year, to 
measure the resonance of Daesh’s propaganda across Egypt as visible on 
social media. 
 
Our linguistic model for Daesh uses software-based corpus analysis methods 
to find patterns in datasets too large for human analysis.43  Our initial model 
                                                     
41 We used an evaluative approach similar to that used in a number of previous studies.  
See Eva Cheng, S. J. Davis, I. Burnett, and Christian Ritz, “The Role of Experts in Social 
Media–Are the Tertiary Educated Engaged?” (Paper presented at Proceedings of the 2010 
IEEE International Symposium on Technology and Society: Social Implications of 
Emerging Technologies, New South Wales, Australia, June 7-9, 2010), available at: 
http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=10764&context=infopapers; Bo Han, 
Paul Cook and Timothy Baldwin, “Text-Based Twitter User Geolocation Prediction,” 
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 49 (2014):  451, available at: 
https://www.jair.org/media/4200/live-4200-7781-jair.pdf. 
42 Confidence bounds for geo-inferencing techniques are generally a lower bound of 
accuracy for that filter, as bounds rely on geo-tagged users as a ground truth dataset with 
which to compare.  Given the bias inherent in geo-tagged data, the effect is similar to that 
of measurement error in our comparison dataset and biases our confidence bound toward 
zero.  
43 The specific software used for this study was RAND-Lex, a RAND developed suite of 
text analysis tools with modules implementing lexicogrammatical and topic-modeling 
methods. 
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was developed through keyness testing, using a log-likelihood approach.  
Keyness testing identifies conspicuously over present words by comparing 
how often words appear in a target collection of text, relative to how often we 
would expect them to appear in a representative sample of language.44  In this 
case, we compared the aforementioned reference corpus for Daesh to a 
standard representative collection of Modern Standard Arabic.45  Keywords 
identify distinctive features of a text collection and, because they are 
weighted, the resulting linguistic model is somewhat analogous to a 
fingerprint analysis.  Our initial keyness tests yielded ninety-seven distinct 
words in Daesh propaganda.  To add greater resolution to our model, we also 
calculated collocates for Daesh.46 
 
Unlike keywords, collocates are statistically conspicuous because of their 
(co)location near each other.47  While there is always a random possibility of 
words being near each other in a text, some words appear near each other/in 
sequence because they have a semantic association: for example, turns of 
phrase ("You know," "I guess," etc.), or prosodic associations, such as 
"habitual" with negative words ("offender," "liar," etc.).  However, collocates 
often refer to abstractions, e.g. proper names ("President Obama,") places 
("New York City"), or concepts ("mass shootings").  This more refined 
approach yielded fifty-one two-word collocates and nine three-word 
collocates for Daesh.  By adding these to the results of our keyness testing, we 
were able to detect much smaller variations of resonance among the sub-
regions of Egypt.  
 
Equation 1, summarizes how we measured word “keyness.”  We used words 
and collocates that surpassed a keyness threshold of 10.83 log-likelihood ratio 
and a minimum frequency of twenty, which corresponds to 99.9 percent 
                                                     
44 M. Scott, “Mapping key words to problem and solution,” n Scott M & Thompson G 
(eds.) Patterns of Text: in Honour of Michael Hoey (Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2008), 109-
128, p. 110. 
45 Motaz K. Saad and Wesam Ashour, “OSAC: Open Source Arabic Corpora,” (paper 
presented at the 6th International Conference on Electrical and Computer System, 
European University of Lefke, Lefke, North Cyprus, November 25-26, 2010), available at: 
doi:10.13140/2.1.4664.9288. 
46 In our first efforts, we found that using keywords alone meant only detecting strong 
resonance; adding collocates increased the granularity of our analysis. 
47 Paul Baker, Costas Gabrielatos, Majid Khosravinik, Michal Krzyżanowski, Tony 
McEnery and Ruth Wodak, “A Useful Methodological Synergy? Combining Critical 
Discourse Analysis and Corpus Linguistics to Examine Discourses of Refugees and 
Asylum Seekers in the UK Press,” Discourse & Society 19:3 (2008): 273, available at: 
doi:10.1177/0957926508088962. 
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confidence that the word(s) distinguish our corpora of interest from more 
general language use.48 
 
Equation 1: Measuring Word “keyness” Through Log Likelihood-Based 
Frequency Analysis 
 
 
 
Where as: 
fp Denotes how often the word appeared in specific reference corpus 
fr Denotes how often the word appears in the general corpus 
Np Counts the total number of words examined in specific reference 
corpus 
Nr Counts the total number of words examined in the general corpus 
Nt Counts the total number of words examined in both reference and 
general corpora 
 
Using this formula, we performed keyness testing on each of the reference 
corpora mentioned previously.49  Table 1, below, is an illustrative sample of 
keywords from the Daesh and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood collections, 
meant to highlight how this method identified distinct language for both 
groups.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
48 Donald E. Hardy, The Body in Flannery O'Connor's Fiction: Computational 
Technique and Linguistic Voice (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 
2007), 98; Dorothy Kenny, Lexis and Creativity in Translation: A Corpus-based Study 
(Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 94.  
49 Paul Rayson and Rroger Garside, “Comparing Corpora Using Frequency Profiling,” 
(paper presented at Workshop on Comparing Corpora ’00 Proceedings of the Workshop 
on Comparing corpora–Volume 9, Hong Kong, October 7, 2000), available at: doi: 
10.3115/1117729.1117730.  
NOT CLEARED FOR OPEN PUBLICATION. DO NOT CIRCULATE OR QUOTE. 
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Keywords provide surprisingly powerful insights because of how much word choice reveals 
about the focus, stance, and social exposures of the author.  For example, during the H1N1 flu 
pandemic of 2009, an author’s propensity to write “H1N1” vs. “swine” corresponded strongly to 
the information sources on which they relied.  Likewise, “fetus” vs. “unborn” is a strong 
predictor of political stance on abortion in the US.  However, in a relatively small minority of 
cases, a phrase of common words takes on significance as a separate concept.  For example, the 
phrase “an arm and a leg” indicates expense, not anatomy in typical American English.   
Consequently, we also examined collocates for the ISIL and Muslim Brotherhood reference 
corpora.  Unlike keywords—words that are conspicuous because of their frequency -- collocates 
are statistically conspicuous because of their (co)location near each other.
76
  We tested for 
keywords and collocates in each of the test collecti ns we had prepared, using a log likelihood 
approach:
77
 
Equation 1: Measuring Word “keyness” Through Log Likelihood-Based Frequency Analysis 
! = 2 ∙ ! ! ∙ !" #
! !
! ! ∙ (! ! +! ! ) ∙ ! !
! ! + ! ! ∙ !" #
! !
! ! ∙ (! ! +! ! ) ∙ ! !
! !  
 
 
Where as: 
! !   Denotes how often the word appeared in specific referen e corpus 
! !   Denotes how often the word appears in the general corpus 
! !  Counts the total number of words examined i  specific erence corpus 
! !  Counts the total number of words examined in the general corpus 
! !  Counts the total number of w rds examined i  b th reference and general corpora 
 
Based on both prior research in testing,
78
 and our own empirical testing in the project, we 
determined that a frequency minimum of 20, and a log-likelihood scoring >10.83,
79
 produced the 
most distinctive keywords and collocates for our data. 
80
 Table 1 below is a sample of keywords 
                                                
76
 Baker, Paul, Costas Gabrielatos, Majid Khosravinik, Michał Krzyżanowski, Tony McEnery, and Ruth Wodak. "A 
useful methodological synergy? Combining critical discourse analysis and corpus linguistics to examine discourses 
of refugees and asylum seekers in the UK press." Discourse & Society 19, no. 3 (2008): 273-306. 
77
 Rayson, P., & Garside, R. (2000, October). Comparing corpora using frequency profiling. In Proceedings of the 
workshop on Comparing Corpora (pp. 1-6). Association for Computational Linguistics. 
78
 Hardy, Donald E. The Body in Flannery O'Connor's Fiction: Computational Technique and Linguistic Voice. 
Donald E. Hardy. Univ of South Carolina Press, 2007: p. 98. 
79
 This corresponds to a 99.9% confidence interval. 
80
 Frequency minimums are a contested issue (see for example Kenny, Dorothy. Lexis and Creativity in Translation: 
A Corpus Based Approach. Routledge, 2014: p. 94) 
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Table 1.  Sample Keywords (KW) and Log-likelihood score (LL) 
from Daesh and Muslim Brotherhood Reference Corpora 
 
Islamic States  Muslim Brotherhood 
KW LL Translation      KW LL Translation 
يوفصلا 2163 The Safavid  ناوخلاا 2882 The Brotherhood 
ةيملاسلاا_ةلودلا 643 #The_Islamic_State  بلاقنلاا 1631 The Coup 
ةفلاخلا 640 the caliphate  بعشلا 914 The People 
ةجولفلا 427 Fallujah  ةعامجلا 434 The Association 
ةكرمشيبلا 360 The Peshmerga  يرصملا 395 The Egyptian 
يضفارلا 271 The Rafidhi  رصم 332 Egypt 
ةلودلا 259 The State  سييرلا 329 the president 
ةيملاسلاا 585 The Islamic  راوثلا 319 The Revolutionaries 
ةدعاقلا 123 Al-Qaeda  ةعامج 266 The group 
قارعلا 78 Iraq  نييبلاقنلاا 265 The coup-supporters 
ماشلا 62 Sham  باهرلاا 257 The terrorism 
 
We wish to point out here that machine-based corpus analysis and human 
expert analysis will identify different features distinctive about a group's 
language.  Whereas human analysis is very well suited to identifying macro-
level themes and concepts in Daesh's public talk, machine-based approaches 
are well suited to detecting the weak signal of micro-level word frequencies.  
Think of a human expert that can visually identify architectural styles at the 
level of buildings, and a machine that can detect architectural styles at the 
level of bricks and mortar—both are looking at the same thing, but using 
different levels of features.50 
 
Given this linguistic model based on distinctive words, we were then able to 
quantify accurately the degree of match between Daesh and every Egyptian 
Twitter user.  To do this, we first summed the likelihood scores of all 
keywords and collocates that appear in each user’s Tweets.  Second, we 
calculated the sum given the total number of words that appeared in the 
user’s Tweets, and the frequency/average score of keywords and collocate 
among all Tweets.  Equation 2, illustrates this approach.  
 
                                                     
50 Sarah Allison, Ryan Heuser, Matthew Jockers, Franco Moretti and Michael Witmore, 
“Quantitative Formalism: An Experiment,” Machine Politics 13 (2012) Available at: 
https://nplusonemag.com/issue-13/essays/quantitative-formalism-an-experiment/. 
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Equation 2: Egyptian Twitter User's Resonance Score 
 
Whereas: 
Ni Counts the number of words appearing in User i’s tweets 
N Counts the number of words appearing in the tweets of all sampled 
users 
fik Denotes the frequency with which a set of keywords and collocates 
appears in user i’s tweets 
fk Denotes the frequency with which a set of keywords and collocates 
appears in the tweets of all users 
L Scores each keyword according to how much more likely it is to appear 
in accounts promoting a certain worldview, compared to a reference 
corpus.   
 
Results 
Table 2 reports the findings from our analysis.  It illustrates the extent to 
which Daesh’s worldview resonated with residents of the four sub-regions of 
Egypt – the Sinai Peninsula, Cairo/Nile Delta, Alexandria/Coast and Upper 
Egypt–in 2014, as indicated through their Twitter use. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marcellino et al.: Popular Resonance of Daesh
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2017
47 
Table 2.  Resonance of Daesh’s Worldview in Egypt during 2014 
 
 
 
 
For each region, four stacked bar graphs go from left to right, corresponding 
to the four quarters of the 2014 calendar year.  Each bar graph measures the 
proportion of Twitter users, in the defined region and time-period, whose 
tweets echo the worldview articulated by Daesh.51  The bar graphs are color 
coded in a “stoplight style:” red indicates that an account used 500 percent 
more Daesh language than we would expect by random chance alone, orange 
indicates 300 percent, yellow indicates 150 percent, and green users with no 
more Daesh language than we would expect by random chance alone..  The 
gray shaded segments between each bar graph highlight changes from one 
quarter to the next within each region and segment of resonance.  
 
We chose to divide the results at 500 percent, 300 percent, and 150 percent 
based on their correspondence to P values across our test cases.  The precise 
correspondence varies with the number of keywords, the average keyness 
score of keywords, and the total number each user’s words available for 
examination.  However, 300 percent was consistently sufficient to identify 
                                                     
51 Given that each region as at least 40 percent of population scoring at “No Resonance,” 
the axis is truncated there to make the table more viewable 
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resonant users with just 1,000 words of user text at P values < 0.05, and 500 
percent was consistently sufficient to achieve P values <0.05 with just 500 
words of user text.  One hundred fifty percent is generally statistically 
significant with a 5,000 sample of user words, but we report here to measure 
the number of users who might potentially be vulnerable to future 
radicalization.  That said, we caveat that these cutoffs are statistically sensible, 
but not substantively meaningful–we do not know what level of resonance 
corresponds to a high likelihood of providing aid to or signing up to fight with 
Daesh.  Future research is necessary to establish better the link between social 
medial outputs, and motivation to take real world action.  
 
The data in Table 2 suggests that only one to two percent of Twitter users pass 
the threshold for high resonance with Daesh.  Even lumping high and 
medium resonance, the total never exceeds – and tends to fall well short of – 
five percent of Twitter users within each region.  Daesh’s way of talking and 
conceptualizing the world is highly salient to just a small sliver of the 
population in Egypt.  However, resonance among this minority is intensely 
strong.  On average, Twitter users who fell above the 300 percent threshold 
were 920 percent more likely to use words matching the Daesh linguistic 
fingerprint, compared to the word use we would expect by random chance 
along.  Daesh’s fervent supporters may be relatively few in number, but they 
are firmly ensconced in the worldview.  Moreover, their numbers grew 
throughout 2014.  In the first quarter, two to four percent of Twitter users in 
each region meet the 300 percent threshold.  By the last quarter, five to seven 
percent of users in each region passed threshold.  The strongest gains 
occurred in the Sinai and Upper Egypt.  
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Table 3.  Resonance of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Worldview in 
Egypt during 2014 
 
We also examined our data from the linguistic “fingerprint” of the Muslim 
Brotherhood -- an organization with similar Salafist ideological roots, but 
without Daesh’s violent extremism.  In keeping with their similar ideological 
roots, there is strong overlap between those passing the 150 percent threshold 
for one group–showing some potential to become more firmly committed to 
the ideology in the future–and those passing it for the other.  In fact, users 
who score as weakly resonant with one group are sixty percent more likely to 
score as weakly resonant with the other, compared to what we would expect 
by random chance alone. 
 
Daesh and the Muslim Brotherhood’s populations deviate, however, in the 
higher thresholds of resonance.  The Muslim Brotherhood had a larger, more 
stable cadre of high to medium resonant users for most of the year—
consistently hovering around six percent in most areas throughout the year—
and users almost never stop being Muslim Brotherhood resonant to start 
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being Islamic State resonant.  In fact, there are only thirteen cases of 
resonance switching out of a sample containing over 30,000 user accounts.52 
 
In most areas, the Muslim Brotherhood platform appears to have kept pace 
with Daesh, but not in the Sinai.  In that region alone, the number of twitter 
accounts passing the 300 percent threshold for the Muslim Brotherhood 
dropped by half, while those passing threshold for the Islamic State rose by a 
commiserate amount.  
 
Validating the Method 
Since our methodology approach involves novel features, we carried out a 
series of additional tests to assess the validity of our procedure.  This section 
presents the results of those tests.  Each test involved an “event” that we 
assumed would have high salience for a large segment of the Egyptian 
populations, and therefore, would produce a noticeable spike in social media 
activity.  Each event is either salient during a specific timeframe or in a 
specific region.  This allowed us to compare our social media measurements 
against known conditions on the ground.53  Table 4, lists the events.  
 
Table 5: Timing by Regionality Matrix 
 Not Year Round Year Round  
Affected 
One Region 
Bombing of Bus Carrying 
Korean Tourists in the Sinai 
Car Bombings of Military 
Installations in the Sinai 
Affected 
All Regions 
Influenza Outbreaks 
(Lull During the Summer) 
MB / IS 
Activities and Ideology 
 
With respect to regions, two of our four test-events took place in the Sinai.  
We chose these events because the Sinai represented the lowest population of 
Twitter users across the four sub-regions, and thereby tends not to trend on 
Twitter unless something newsworthy has taken place.  In both of the event-
tests, the Sinai region registered the largest number of Twitter users 
“resonating” with the news event.  This suggests that our methodology is able 
to accuracy detect geographic differences in resonance.  
 
                                                     
52 Nine cases of Muslim Brotherhood resonators became Islamic State resonant, and four 
cases of Islamic State resonators became Muslim Brotherhood resonant. 
53 Methodological differences exist between detecting talk about an event and adopting 
language from a group. 
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We also tested based on timing.  Two of our four tests involved predictable 
variation in timing over the course of 2014.  The bombing of a bus carrying 
Korean tourists happened on an exact day, while influenza activity (unusually 
high in 2014) typically experiences a pronounced lull during the summer.  
Both tests cautioned that the relationship between twitter activity and event 
timing is more complex than its relationship with geographic proximity.  In 
the case of the bus bombing, the Cairo and Alexandria regions show the 
expected pattern–resonance was highest in the first quarter, and declined 
thereafter.  However, in Sinai, where the bombing took place, resonance 
continued to grow in the second quarter.  In the case of influenza, resonance 
declined in all four regions during the summer, as expected, but the decline in 
percentage of resonant users was smaller than we initially expected.  Thus, 
while both tests suggest that Twitter resonance does reflect the timing of 
events, they also suggest a certain degree of inertia–the social media 
conversation can fuel itself, even as the inciting event becomes more distant.   
 
Conclusion 
This article used an innovative combination of corpus linguistics and 
statistical methods to gain insight into one of the most salient threats to US 
national security today: Daesh and its appeal to local populations outside Iraq 
and Syria.  To do this, we measured the uptake of Daesh propaganda in four 
sub-regions of Egypt for 2014.  The findings suggest that only a limited 
proportion of Twitter users echo the discourse of Daesh’s worldview, but 
where there is support is intense.  Further, Daesh’s discourse gained ground 
during the course of 2014 in the Sinai and (to a lesser extent) Upper Egypt, 
especially in comparison to the Muslim Brotherhood. 
 
In terms of the methodology, our findings suggest that resonance analysis can 
serve as a measure of effectiveness of messaging efforts, by detecting and 
quantifying the uptake of a particular discourse (and implicit framing of the 
world) among a populace over time.  If applied correctly, United States 
policymakers and their partners overseas can use these methods to triage 
counter-messaging efforts against extremist group's recruitment and 
expansion.  We point out this approach also can be used to assess the 
effectiveness of countering violent extremism (CVE) programs: we can turn 
this lens on our own efforts.  
 
While we acknowledge serious limitations with this method (social media 
data is not representative, and measuring uptake tells us nothing about the 
why's of any change), in comparison to many other approaches to population 
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observation, this methodology is highly cost effective to apply as mass scale.  
It uses off-the-shelf technology, lightweight computational strategies to 
enable analysis of large data with relatively few computational resources, and 
relies on social media data, which is affordable, available in real time, and of 
proven relevance in CVE efforts.  
 
Beyond these applications, we believe resonance analysis helps evaluate the 
potential second- and third-order effects of counter-terrorism efforts on local 
populations.  For example, one can assess whether resonance with Daesh 
increases because of airstrikes against senior leaders or operatives, use it as 
an indicator of recruitment effects, or as an indicator of shifts in support in 
response to specified counterterrorism measures.  Finally, resonance is a 
methodology that allows policymakers to capture quickly and less expensively 
socio-cultural dynamics essential in mitigating the threats posed by violent 
extremists. 
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